In a little-discussed paper of Alvin Plantinga’s, ‘Divine Knowledge,’ (in Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, edited by C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (Eerdmans, 1993)), he discusses and defends the thesis that it is no objection to accepting the truth of God knows that p that We do not know how God knows that p. That we do not know how God knows some matter is a fragment of negative or apophatic theology. Accepting this fragment entails that when we refer to God’s knowledge this bears no better than an analogical relation to our own knowledge: the two possess points in common, which make each a case of knowledge; and have points of difference, (the negative theological fragment), which together ensure that the knowledge in question is either a case of our knowledge, or of God’s.
Plantinga begins by discussing the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (as part of Molinism), and the frequently advanced objection to their existence that it is impossible to say what grounds their truth. (49) The objection to such counterfactual statements, that they cannot answer the grounding objection, boils down to ‘We cannot see how God knows them, [the counterfactuals of freedom] so there cannot be any’. Plantinga’s point is that the fact that we are ignorant of how God can know such counterfactuals of creaturely freedom does not affect their truth. Indeed there are good reasons why we are ignorant. There are such counterfactuals, he claims, and we can assume, from his omniscience, that God knows them. End of story.