Analysis 3 - Systematic and Biblical Theology

‘Let me be clear: while I affirm theodrama as a unified macroperspective, I also affirm a plurality of canonical microperspectives that bring different aspects of the theodrama into the foreground.’ - Kevin Vanhoozer.

Berkhofian systematic theology offers us a snapshot of the cognitive framework of the faith. In that sense what is asserts is timeless, even though, as with all fallible human endeavours, it is always open to revision. The snapshot can be brought into clearer focus, or given a wider angle. For some people, one source of the unease with Berkhofism is that it is not ‘dynamic’ enough. But in fact it is not dynamic at all. It is avowedly ‘static’. In the interests of promoting ‘dynamism’ efforts are currently made to integrate systematic theology and biblical theology. But nothing but confusion can arise from such attempts.

According to Geerhardus Vos ’Biblical Theology is that branch of Exegetical Theology which deals with the process of the self-revelation of God deposited in the Bible.’ (Biblical Theology, 5) Intrinsic to this definition is the idea of process, of temporal sequence. So there will be trouble if we attempt to conflate Berkhofism with Vosism. A ‘dynamic’ or a ‘theodramatic’ approach to systematic theology conveys a strong desire to conflate them, to merge a concern for logical consistency and difference and implication with the flow of particular narratives. But it is doomed to failure.

What happens is that in this effort to combine a narrative and a logical approach to theology the narrative approach invariably wins out. Stories are so much more fun than logical deductions and discriminations. The result is : it is impossible to combine the narrative and logical approaches in this way. It can’t be done. That’s why ‘narrative theology’ of whatever stripe can never take the place of systematic theology, nor revamp it, and current attempts to make the one supplant (or ‘energise’) the other are simply misguided, and dangerous in their consequences.

Of course systematic theology deals with temporal sequences - with the entire drama of redemption - and with sequences within that grand sequence, such as conversion, and the nature of the Christian life. But it does not treat these sequences simply or chiefly as sequences, but seeks to integrate their essential features with other aspects of God's revelation which are not temporally sequential, aspects which have to do (in the old language which makes some people shudder), with essences and natures, such as the existence and nature of Almighty God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and with human nature, prelapsarian, lapsed, redeemed and glorified. With the nature of faith, and the nature of sin.

Vos himself was fully at ease with the distinction between systematic theology and biblical theology, and with the legitimacy of each, being somewhat Berkhofish in his own right. (He was the author of a multi-volume systematic theology in Dutch). His view of the relation between the two is worth noting.

There is no difference in that one would be more closely bound to the Scriptures than the other. In this they are wholly alike. Nor does the difference lie in this, that the one transforms the Biblical material, whereas the other would leave it unmodified. Both equally make the truth deposited in the Bible undergo a transformation: but the difference arises from the fact that the principles by which the transformation is effected differ. In Biblical Theology the principle is one of historical, in Systematic Theology it is one of logical construction. Biblical Theology draws a line of development. Systematic Theology draws a circle. (15-16)

The insoluble problem that those who favour some kind of integration between biblical and systematic theology face is that they overlook this fundamental point: that logical distinctions do not necessarily correspond with temporal sequences, and that temporal sequences may have non-temporal aspects, or presuppose what is non-temporal.

Let us take an illustration. The ordo salutis (Rom 8.28 etc.) is a sequence, part of the grand narrative of redemption. But the concepts introduced into our understanding of that sequence, and the distinctions between them, between regeneration, conviction of sin, penitence, faith, assured faith, the external call, effectual calling, justification and sanctification etc. are logical distinctions. Do they all also record temporal distinctions as well? Is justification an event? And is sanctification another, coupled to the carriage of justification and pulled along by it? Is the carriage of justification in turn pulled along by the carriage of faith? Where does adoption fit in? Has it to be squeezed in somewhere between regeneration and faith? Or between faith and justification? Or is adoption simply another description of one or more of these elements? And what about union with Christ: is this also part of the temporal sequence of separately-identifiable occurrences? If so, can we find a gap for it, a spare carriage for it to occupy? Is the decree of God, eternally foreknowing the redeemed, also an event?

Systematic theology in the Berkhofian sense has its eye on distinctions and discriminations in an effort to link one area of biblical revelation consistently with all the others, to integrate the whole. Hence Vos's figure of a circle. Some of these distinctions are temporal, one thing following in time after another, some are causal, one thing bringing about the other, while others are purely logical, one thing being distinct from another. But biblical theology in the Vosian sense has its eye on the temporal unfolding of the one redemptive-historical sequence. It is a line.

The logical distinctions inherent in systematic theology, and which we may be inclined to dismiss as 'academic', are vital. If we remain for the moment in the area of the ordo salutis then we need to be able think clearly about what goes on, and the significance of what goes on, when men and women are called by grace. Systematic theologians do this by formulating distinctions in an effort to discriminate the various elements in conversion as these are revealed to us in Scripture, and to protect them as far as possible from misunderstanding. So an understanding of conversion in which regeneration (logically) precedes faith is importantly different from one in which faith logically precedes regeneration, even though these two elements – regeneration, faith – may be temporally simultaneous, and may be partly hidden from public view in every narrative account of conversion that Scripture gives us. These two understandings of conversion are importantly different because of what each of these understandings implies about the work of the Holy Spirit in conversion. These discriminations are thus not made for merely ‘academic’ purposes. They are not mere logic chapping. Following one, and not the other, has ramifications which reverberate across the whole fabric of theology.

Part of the fruit of achieving a degree of understanding of conversion, say, is that it is possible to attempt the integration of the various elements that divine revelation discloses about conversion, including of course reports of conversion in Scripture, part of its narrative, with the teaching of other areas of revelation, for example, with the work of the Holy Spirit in applying the fruits of Christ’s redemption, and the nature of human sin. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the systematic theologian must make the various discriminations of the elements within effectual calling with an eye that is fixed at the same time on the biblical teaching on, for example, the work of the Holy Spirit.

Take the conversion narratives of Lydia, or Zaccheus, or Saul of Tarsus, or the Ethiopian eunuch, or…..Could one formulate an adequate doctrine of conversion by making a generalisation from an induction of these cases? Obviously not. The differences between them are fascinating and important. But what is conversion? Are these all cases of conversion? And what of Nathanael, of Judas, of Ananias and Sapphira? So how is a theology of conversion to be established? By taking the biblical narratives of conversion (real or apparent) as one datum, the biblical teaching on human sin as another datum, its teaching on the work of the Holy Spirit as another, and so on. How are these to be brought together? That’s work for the systematic theologian.

Even where there is a temporal sequence, it does not follow that each element in the sequence is an event which brings about, in a causally efficacious way, the next element in the sequence. Regeneration may cause faith, but does faith cause justification? How are we to understand the 'he alsos' of Romans 8.28 etc.? Does Paul imply, in that passage, that faith causes justification? Yes and no, as the later proposal that faith is to be regarded as the instrumental cause of justification indicates. Does justification cause glorification? That would be confused. Though justification is logically prior to sanctification, it is neither temporally prior to sanctification, nor does it cause it, and it does not cause everything that follows, like one moving carriage may shunt the next one.

It has been said that it is a mistake to think of the elements in the ordo salutis as a series of acts. That is a helpful remark, except that we need to reflect further about an ‘act’. Is the Coronation Service one act, or many? Does the act that is the crowning of the Monarch include within it other acts? It would seem so. Is effectual calling one act, or many? Is it an act that has many elements? Is union with Christ an act? If David enrols at Eton College the expected male child that his wife Maureen is carrying, is the child already in the school?

As Bishop Butler once observed, everything is what it is and not another thing. Logical sequence is not necessarily temporal sequence. Temporal sequence is not necessarily causal sequence. Systematic Theology cannot be Biblical Theology. It cannot be theodrama either.

Analysis 2 - Propositions and Speech Acts

‘Take away assertions, and you take away Christianity’ - Martin Luther

In this note I comment on the current idea that ‘speech-acts’ ought to supplant propositions in our view of divine revelation, (this 'propositionalist' view has been called the ‘Hodge-Henry hypothesis). Speech-acts , it is said, hold a key, if not the key, to a much-needed re-shaping of systematic theology. It is argued that the 'static view' of propositional revelation must give way to the ‘dramatic’ view of revelation as God’s speech-acts.

The term ‘speech-act’ arose from the work of J.L. Austin in the 1950’s. (How To Do Things With Words (published in 1962 after Austin’s early death) is the seminal work.) However, we must not confuse the term with the thing. Appreciation of speech-acts is by no means a novelty in biblical interpretation, as we shall see.

But first we need to note a couple of things about speech-acts. In his work Austin focused upon performative utterances; forms of utterance in which to say something is to do something. The standard example is the wedding ceremony. In saying ‘I do’ at the appropriate points, the groom and the bride are wed. Such acting-by-speaking occurs because of the existence of certain conventions; in the case of marriage, certain legal and moral conventions which govern the marriage service, making it the sort of occasion that it is. Saying ‘I resign’ is, in certain circumstances, to resign, saying ‘I apologise’ is an apology, and so on. (Incidentally, sometimes we are told that the Lord’s creative fiats in Genesis 1 are instances of performatives, but this is a mistake. In Genesis 1 the reason that God’s saying is his doing is not in virtue of any conventions, but solely because of his supreme power.) As noted, there are many types of speech-act: including asking questions, giving orders, and (most importantly for us) making assertions. In appropriate circumstances, saying ‘The cat is on the mat’ is asserting that the cat is on the mat.

The idea that in view of Austin’s work we are faced with a new choice: either a speech-act view of divine revelation, or a propositional view, won’t stand up. For propositions are used to make assertions, to express beliefs, true propositions to express true beliefs. Assertion is a familiar and fundamental type of speech-act. Propositions standardly have this form in Scripture. In addition, the whole of divine revelation in Scripture is confessed by the Christian church to be God’s speech. We might think of the whole of Scripture as being enclosed within speech marks, with other sets of speech marks occurring within Scripture.

Not surprisingly, this point was widely recognised well before the 1950’s. However, no-one who holds the standard view of propositional revelation doubts that the Scriptures contain other forms of utterance than assertions. But since Scripture is taken to be a revelation, with a unique cognitive value, assertions have primacy because its other speech forms – exclamations, questions, etc. – logically depend for their own force and intelligibility on a bedrock of assertions. The exclamation ‘How good is the Lord!’ implies the truth of the assertion ‘The Lord is good’. Those who uphold the propositional character of divine revelation - those who subscribe to the 'Hodge-Henry hypothesis' - have nothing more or less in mind than the central importance of assertions, especially God's assertions about himself, in Scripture.

The second point is that the same form of words can be used to make different and incompatible speech acts. The question ‘Have you cleaned your teeth, yet?’ may have the force (in circumstances familiar to parents) of ‘Please clean your teeth’ or ‘Clean your teeth at once!’. Others besides parents have long understood this. In the case of the language of Scripture it may not always be easy to determine what is the force of the original speech-act, partly because its force (its ‘illocutionary force’ as Austin put it) of the utterance depends on tone, and on other non-verbal cues such as body-language, which as interpreters of Scripture we are largely ignorant of. When Jesus said . ‘Martha, Martha, you are anxious and troubled about many things, but one thing is necessary’, (Lk. 10.41-2), what was his facial expression? Was Jesus serious or jocular? Was Vermeer correctly catching Jesus’ mood by having him extend his arm, palm open, to Mary? Does the context, and what else we know about Jesus – our Christology - answer this question without us needing to know his tone of voice? Would a video-clip help? Perhaps it would. But perhaps we have sufficient information from the words on the page and what else we know from Scripture to enable us to interpret the passage accurately, though naturally enough we'd like to have more.

With the help of John Calvin we can reflect on another biblical incident, the drama of Hezekiah’s sickness and recovery, (Isaiah 38) and note the conditions in which some of the language of the drama occurs, and understand the language accordingly, seeing for instance that the Lord’s words 'Set your house in order, for you shall die; you shall not recover' not as a prediction but as a warning. Commenting the Lord’s response to Hezekiah’s prayer, after the Lord had said that he would die, Calvin says

It may be thought strange that God, having uttered a sentence, should soon after be moved, as it were, by repentance to reverse it; for nothing is more at variance with his nature than a change of purpose. (How does Calvin know this? Because he takes from elsewhere in Scripture its teaching about the immutability or steadfastness of the Lord.) I reply, while death was threatened against Hezekiah, still God had not decreed it, but determined in this manner to put to the test of the faith of Hezekiah. (So the Lord’s words had a particular force, not the force of a decree or infallible prediction, but of a threat. His intention was to threaten Hezekiah.) We must, therefore, suppose a condition to be implied in that threatening; for otherwise Hezekiah would not have altered, by repentance or prayer, the irreversible decree of God. (Commentary on Is. 38.4, CTS, III.157-8. There is more in Calvin’s treatment of this incident that is relevant)

So (500 years ago) Calvin had regard to the particular force that expressions may have, a concern that is now a prominent feature of speech-act theory. The Lord's words to Hezekiah are a threat, not a decree. Calvin pays attention to the flow of the narrative. But for all our adherence to the narrative, we cannot ourselves be Hezekiah, or be back in his time. After all, the story is in front of us and we have read it through endless times and know how it goes. The idea that we come closer to the nature of God’s revelation by adopting a kind of ‘real time’ approach to the text is jejune. The events were pretty dramatic for Hezekiah, much less so, if at all, for us. The idea that focusing on speech-acts will make the Bible more dramatic for us is a non-starter.

It’s only because we know (from elsewhere in Scripture) that God is utterly trustworthy and unchangeably true, and that we already know, as we re-read the story, how it turns out, that it is reasonable to believe that the Lord’s words to Hezekiah have the form of a threat, a test to elicit faith, and not a prediction which fails or may fail, or a decree which the Lord quickly countermands by another decree.

It’s not a matter of favouring prose and disparaging poetry, either. The poetry of Psalm 139 (an example used by my friend Guy Davies, who got me going on this) is full of propositions, of assertions. Of course it is full of questions too, and of exclamations, and so there’s the danger here of a false polarisation between propositions (or assertions) and other linguistic forms. But (as noted earlier) the other forms of speech are intelligible only because they imply (either logically or conversationally) certain propositions, and so themselves presuppose. ‘Shut the door!’ presupposes the truth of some or all of the assertions ‘The door can be shut’ or ‘The door is not shut’ or ‘You may shut the door’ or 'The door is shut when it is fixed within its frame by some kind of latch', and so on.

It is the assertions that the very many different speech-acts to be found in Scripture presuppose - the true assertions, or propositions, about God and his ways - that provide the bedrock of theological reflection that goes to form systematic theology.

So - as is usual in thinking theologically - we need a historical perspective if we are not to be bowled over by the latest big words. This perspective gives us a sense of proportion. More importantly, we need a little philosophy, in this case the idea of propositions and assertions, what accounts for their meaning, and their fundamental character as truth-bearers.

Attempting to make the form of systematic theology more ‘participatory’ by stressing its 'dramatic' character, and by talking about speech-acts as its jazzy units, will not ensure participation in the Gospel, nor will it help to ensure it. It’s likely outcome is something that will make participation in the Gospel more difficult. For it will fuzzy the distinctive cognitive character of God's revelation, its good news, and make our thinking about divine things less exact, and less exacting.

A New Development: Analysis

Alongside the monthly posting of drafts of pieces that are scheduled for publication I hope in future to begin a series of short discussions on themes and topics on which, it seems to me, philosophy can be of some assistance to theology. These will be headed ‘Analysis’, after the philosophy journal of that name, which is devoted to publishing short discussions.

The first three or four (perhaps more) will be on the general theme:

Systematic Theology: Since It Isn’t Broken, We Ought Not To Try To Fix It.

One increasingly meets basic misunderstandings about Reformed systematic theology: of what it is, what it attempts to do, what its limits are, and where its abiding value lies. Proposals that are made for developing new methods in systematic theology would often amount to changing its entire character while retaining the name. These brief discussions will attempt to highlight misunderstandings and to allay some fears. So this is how I hope it’ll go:

Analysis 1, ‘What definitions do and don’t do’, now posted.

Analysis 2, ‘Propositions and Speech Acts’, now posted.

Analysis 3, ‘Biblical and Systematic Theology’, now posted.

Papers that have been accepted for publication but have not yet been published will continue be posted on this site each month.

The next Analysis, to be posted in July, will be on Bishop N.T. Wright's account of the ordo salutis, and the next paper will on Samuel Rutherford and Toleration.