Peter Martyr Vermigli, exiled from Italy, with the Inquisition breathing down his neck, lectured in Strasbourg 1542-1548, when he went to England with Bucer and others. Calvin had been in Strasbourg 1538-41 as an exile, as it turned out. So as far as I can see they did not meet there, narrowly missing each other. Following the death of Edward VI Vermigli lectured on Aristotle on his return to Strasbourg from England, 1553 -1555/6, alternating with fellow Italian and Aristotelian Jerome Zanchius, who lectured on Aristotle’s Physics. He then went to Zurich as Pellican’s successor, and died in 1562. Calvin had a very high opinion of him, a ‘highly respected brother’ (1554), ‘most accomplished sir, and distinguished servant of Christ’ (1554). He was not disposed to agree with the followers of Osiander that Vermigli was ‘more devoted to profane philosophy than to heavenly wisdom’. (Letters 3.60)
Vermigli’s extensive lectures, recently translated for the first time into English, run to over 400 pages. Apparently he gave them while at the same time commenting on the book of Judges. Though he provides a summary of all Ten Books of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the commentary itself runs only as far as Book 3 chapter 2. (xvii), presumably first interrupted by and then suspended permanently by his move to Zurich in 1556, where Conrad Gesner was already teaching philosophy. After Vermigli’s death in 1562 the lectures edited by Santerenziano, were published by his Zurich colleagues. They have now been translated into English for the first time and edited by Emidio Campi and Joseph C. McLelland, forming Vol.9 of the Peter Martyr Library. (Trueman State University Press, Kirksville, Miss, 2006).
This short paper has arisen from trying to familiarise myself with what for me was, initially, a surprising fact, and to try to understand why it should be less surprising. We tend – or I tend - to think of the Reformation during the second half of the 16th century as chiefly if not exclusively concerned, with the recovery of the authority of Scripture, the re-pristination of Christian theology, and with meeting the need for polemical and expository works arising therefrom, including of course, and alas, a good deal of internecine debate.
So it is of some interest (to me at least) to find a Reformer of the generation of John Calvin (Vermigli was ten years older than Calvin, and died shortly before him), lecturing in the 1550’s so extensively on Aristotle’s corpus. It is not surprising that a Reformed theologian who was Aristotelian by training, like Vermigli and Zanchius were, should retain a fondness for the Stagirite – what could be more natural? – just as Calvin retained a fondness for the Stoics, say, but that they should devote precious time to expounding his writings at such length seemed odd. But I learn from the Introduction to this book that five sets of similar lectures on Aristotle’s ethics had already been published before Vermigli lectured, those by Melanchthon (twice), Werdmuller, Scheegkius, and Hyperius, though he does not refer to any of them. So perhaps I should not have been surprised. Such as Richard Muller have pointed out how, by the turn of the century 16th century, the Reformed churches were becoming institutionalised, and education was having to be provided to a rising generation of Reformed professional men, including of course ministers. (Geneva?) It is natural, as part of this, to find a curriculum being developed within seminaries, with attention being given to the teaching of philosophy. But it is somewhat surprising, or was to me, to find such extensive attention being paid to Aristotle 50 years earlier. Maybe the attention was nothing like as extensive as that which subsequently followed, or perhaps the process of institutionalisation began earlier than I imagined; certainly it was earlier in Strasbourg and Zurich than in Geneva.
Whatever the truth, I am still struck by a sharp contrast between the rather careful if not exactly reverential attitude towards Aristotle’s ethics of Vermigli as compared with Calvin’s attitude to the moral philosophy of the Greeks.
Calvin's most basic criticism of pagan philosophers and those Christians unduly influenced by them, such as later mediaevals, is that in their analysis of free will and virtue and vice 'they were seeking in a ruin for a building'.
Hence the great obscurity faced by the philosophers, for they were seeking in a ruin for a building, and in scattered fragments for a well-knit structure. They held this principle, that man would not be a rational animal unless he possessed free choice of good and evil; also it entered their minds that the distinction between virtues and vices would be obliterated if man did not order his life by his own planning. Well reasoned so far - if there had been no change in man. But since this was hidden from them, it is no wonder they mix up heaven and earth.
One consequence of this is that (in Calvin's judgment) they have deficient views of human fallenness; not surprisingly, for they have no concept of a fall. In Inst. II.II.2 Calvin repeatedly inveighs against 'the philosophers' (they are referred to five or six times in two short sections and their view of the 'bondage of the senses' (servitutem sensus).
The attitude of Vermigli to moral philosophers, or at least to one moral philosopher, is much less sharp, as we shall see.This is not to say that the two outlooks were antithetical, and it may be that they have different views of philosophical ethics, Calvin seeing in such work a potential challenge to the gospel, Vermigli seeing it more as an adjunct. I shall spend some time attempting to understand Vermigli’s attitude to the relation between Aristotle and Scripture, then (in the second post) look at two topics, virtue and habit, and voluntary action. I choose these partly because Calvin also has general philosophical remarks on them, though of course much briefer than Vermigli’s, but it might still be worthwhile standing the two Reformers side by side.
Vermigli’s practice in the Commentary is to give his chief attention to an intensive discussion of Aristotle’s text, occasionally with some help from the Byzantine philosopher and theologian Eustratius of Nicaea (c.1050 – c.1120), noting textual variants and expounding Aristotle in a manner that, in the main, upholds and commends what he is doing. Towards the end of most lectures, Vermigli provides a Scriptural support or comment on what has just been discussed, using words such as, ‘It remains to look at how the above statements agree with holy scripture’. (47) What then follows may turn out to be an endorsement of Aristotle’s doctrine by Scripture, as in his provision from Scripture of different types of voluntary action and their value, (as we shall see later), more or less fully agreeing with Aristotle’s views. Or it could be a reminder to the reader that since Aristotle knew nothing of the grace of justification, nor of the life to come, Aristotle’s definition or characterisation of happiness is deficient in its attitude to death, or in the importance that he gives to material possessions as a necessary condition of happiness. (216) A similar attitude is found in remarks about the contemplative life, which Aristotle sees as the ultimate form of or ideal for human life, on which Vermigli comments (178) that contemplation can form only a part of the Christian life, with a sidelong glance, no doubt, at forms of monastic community and solitariness. On one occasion (Comm. on Bk.I VI), within the body of the lecture, there is a quite extensive discussion of Aristotle’s famous account of universals in the Nicomachean Ethics, including comments from Augustine, and the bearing of the topic on the doctrine of God. When he discusses Aristotle’s views on providence and fortune he is particularly scathing. (219-21) ‘Now was the time [for Aristotle] to affirm categorically that [happiness] should be expected from God no less than other gifts. In speaking this way, he attempts to avoid the shame of being impious, but does not merit the praise of having given an open and candid confession. If his views were good and right he should not have used these evasions.’ (220) ‘Aristotle speaks ambiguously about whether God is the author of happiness, but we affirm that point most constantly’. (230)
Sometimes the ‘Christian’ application seems so different from what Aristotle is taken to be saying as to make the much longer and more elaborate discussion of Aristotle seem beside the point. So at the opening of his discussion of Bk I Ch.4, where Aristotle discusses his procedure (in his determination of what happiness is) Vermigli is bold enough to say regarding the constituent parts of what happiness is that Holy Scripture ’is more preferable in this context than philosophy’, (78) for it proposes a two-fold end for us, one in this life and one in the life to come. But he goes on to endorse Aristotle’s own procedure in establishing the nature of true happiness, proceeding from effects to their causes, moving from just, brave, well-balanced, prudent actions to their corresponding virtues, which, together with the premise that virtues depend upon happiness as their goal, enables Aristotle to arrive at an understanding of what happiness is, rather than adopt the procedure of first defining happiness. (81, 83) This gives rise to a detailed epistemological discussion. (91-2) The supreme end in this life is that we be justified in Christ which differs from the end of eternal life only in degree. Nevertheless even this supports Aristotle’s view that there are great differences among people as to what happiness is. Yet in Scripture God seeks to establish faith in himself, his greatness, by what he does. He appeals to Romans 8.32 – He who gave up his only son will freely give us all things besides. ‘As Aristotle wishes to use demonstrations based on results and consequences, so from the effects just mentioned, we may conclude that we have acquired eternal happiness’. Yet while Aristotle restricts his ethical teaching to a certain kind of student, to those without corrupt minds, God invites anyone to study his teaching. (92)
One might draw various conclusions from this style of comparing and contrasting. Vermigli might take the view that lectures on Aristotle are not the time or the place to discuss Christian theology at length. If so then this is likely to emanate from a warm endorsement of Aristotle’s general outlook on the place of reason in ethics, on the nature of virtue and its relation to happiness, holding that this is so satisfactory that it only needs a little tweaking from the Christian theologian. For the most part it looks as if he thinks that a Christian outlook can be bolted onto the body of Aristotle’s thought.
Another possibility, which Vermigli seems occasionally to favour, is that Aristotle is dealing with family and especially civic virtue, and so we must bear in mind that the Nicomachean Ethics is simply the first part of a two volume work on political ethics. In which case this would be the wrong place to look for an account of ethics which places a premium on motive and intention in the manner of, say, Augustine, or of the New Testament. So for example Vermigli comments ‘Nor should we fail to point our that Aristotle spoke improperly when he said that action ‘will of necessity be acting and acting well’ since in truth it is not the action that acts, but that by which men act. But he could speak like this because the distinction is not important for the question under discussion’. (204) Aristotle is telling us how we ought to behave in the polis, what the good political life consists in, and so has things of direct value to the Christian in that role; otherwise we should be blaming Aristotle for do doing something that he was not trying to do in the first place.
Writing of the governing of the passions, he says
One thing now remains to be seen: how these passions may be governed and corrected. The first is the ‘civil’ way, through moral virtues. These bring the passions back to the mean and are sufficient, if we consider only the present life before God, however they are not so, nor does civil justice suffice before his judgment seat. There is need, then, for another standard, namely that of holy scripture, which is useless unless it is grasped by faith.(319)
As I say, there is some evidence for such a view: At one place (197) Vermigi asks, does not the scriptural statement that those whose sins have been forgiven and whose iniquities are forgiven are blessed (Ps.32.1-2) not refute the Aristotelian motif the end of man is happiness revealed in action? Vermigli replies
We are not speaking of that kind of happiness, but only of the happiness that follows primary happiness and lies in acting properly in this life and in contemplating and enjoying the sight of the supreme God in the world to come In other words. (197)
See also his reference to the virtues being political (253), having to do with the nature of civil morality. (319) So there is some ambiguity here. Sometimes Vermigli says that moral action has the same structure in Aristotle and in the gospel. (41) At other times he gently makes the point that Aristotle was a stranger to God’s revelation in Jesus. At still other times he forcefully criticises Aristotle for his paganism. Though I am not aware that Vermigli uses the terminology, he may at times be suggesting that the ethics of Aristotle has to do chiefly, if not exclusively, with the earthly kingdom, and not with the kingdom of God. Certainly at one place he endorses the thought given prominence by Calvin that whatever the source of some truth God the Holy Spirit is its ultimate author. As Vermigli puts the point, ‘we do not deny the sentiment that is hallowed by the centuries, which says that any truth set forth by any author proceeds from the Holy Spirit’.
One other thing occurred to me: the pattern of detailed exegesis and commentary of Aristotle, followed usually by a much briefer scriptural comment, is consistent with Vermigli having first prepared and given the lectures at some stage in his earlier years in Italy – either before he adopted evangelical views, or afterwards. If afterwards, if the lectures were prepared and delivered (1537-1542) then the evangelical views, the comments on scripture, may already have been present in them; if earlier, then they may have been added during this later period as he climbed up the rungs of the ladder of the Augustinian order, finally becoming abbot of St. Pietro and Aram in Naples (1537-40) and Prior of S. Frediano in Lucca (1541-42), during which time he established a reformed theological college. There is some additional evidence for this, perhaps: those theological discussions that occur within a lecture, as opposed to being at its end, are not specifically Protestant. We have already noted a discussion of Augustine and platonic ideas, and there is one on Pelagianism, (216) which one might expect from an Augustinian friar. There are exceptions, however. In the middle of one lecture he criticises ‘what the Papists do in reducing the pure religion of Christ, which is already complete in itself, to a histrionic Mass’. (205) So the form of the lectures is generally consistent with them being in existence before Vermigli fled Italy, and then being ‘Protestantized’ by having a tail added to most of them, giving Scriptural comments of a Protestant kind. Why prepare more lectures when one already has a perfectly good set? The pre-existence of the lectures may even have determined that in Strasbourg he lectured on the Nicomachean Ethics and not on some other part of the Aristotelian corpus.
A similar attitude is found in remarks about the contemplative life, which Aristotle sees as the ultimate form of or ideal for human life, on which Vermigli comments (178) that contemplation can form only a part of the Christian life, with a sidelong glance, no doubt, at forms of monastic community and solitariness. On one occasion (Comm. on Bk.I VI), within the body of the lecture, there is a quite extensive discussion of Aristotle’s famous account of universals in theNicomachean Ethics, including comments from Augustine, and the bearing of the topic on the doctrine of God. When he discusses Aristotle’s views on providence and fortune he is particularly scathing (219-21) ‘Now was the time [for Aristotle] to affirm categorically that [happiness] should be expected from God no less than other gifts. In speaking this way, he attempts to avoid the shame of being impious, but does not merit the praise of having given an open and candid confession. If his views were good and right he should not have used these evasions.’ (220) ‘Aristotle speaks ambiguously about whether God is the author of happiness, but we affirm that point most constantly’. (230)
Sometimes the ‘Christian’ application seems so different from what Aristotle is taken to be saying as to make the much longer and more elaborate discussion of Aristotle seem beside the point. So at the opening of his discussion of Bk I Ch.4, where Aristotle discusses his procedure (in his determination of what happiness is) Vermigli is bold enough to say regarding the constituent parts of what happiness is that holy scripture ’is more preferable in this context than philosophy’, (78) for it proposes a two-fold end for us, one in this life and one in the life to come. But he goes on to endorse Aristotle’s own procedure in establishing the nature of true happiness, proceeding from effects to their causes, from just, brave, well-balanced, prudent actions to their corresponding virtues, which, together with the premise that virtues depend upon happiness as their goal, enables Aristotle to arrive at an understanding of what happiness is, rather than adopt the procedure of first defining happiness. (81, 83) This gives rise to a detailed epistemological discussion. (91-2) The supreme end in this life is that we be justified in Christ which differs from the end of eternal life only in degree. Nevertheless even this supports Aristotle’s view that there are great differences among people as to what happiness is. Nevertheless in Scripture God seeks to establish faith in himself, his greatness, by what he does. He appeals to Romans 8.32 – He who gave up his only son will freely gives us all things besides. ‘As Aristotle wishes to use demonstrations based on results and consequences, so from the effects just mentioned, we may conclude that we have acquired eternal happiness’. Yet while Aristotle restricts his ethical teaching to a certain kind of student, to those without corrupt minds, God invites anyone to study his teaching. (92)
One might draw various conclusions from this style of comparing and contrasting. Vermigli might take the view that lectures on Aristotle are not the time or the place to discuss Christian theology at length. If so then this is likely to emanate from a warm endorsement of Aristotle’s general outlook on the place of reason in ethics, on the nature of virtue and its relation to happiness, holding that this is so satisfactory that it only needs a little tweaking from the Christian theologian. For the most part it looks as if he thinks that a Christian outlook can be bolted onto the body of Aristotle’s thought.
Another possibility, which Vermigli seems occasionally to favour, is that Aristotle is dealing with family and especially civic virtue, and so we must bear in mind that the Nicomachean Ethics is simply the first part of a two volume work on political ethics. In which case this would be the wrong place to look for an account of ethics which places a premium on motive and intention in the manner of, say, Augustine, or of the New Testament. So for example Vermigli comments ‘Nor should we fail to point our that Aristotle spoke improperly when he said that action ‘will of necessity be acting and acting well’ since in truth it is not the action that acts, but that by which men act. But he could speak like this because the distinction is not important for the question under discussion’. (204) Aristotle is telling us how we ought to behave in the polis, what the good political life consists in, and so has things of direct value to the Christian in that role; otherwise we should be blaming Aristotle for do doing something that he was not trying to do in the first place.
Writing of the governing of the passions, he says
One thing now remains to be seen: how these passions may be governed and corrected. The first is the ‘civil’ way, through moral virtues. These bring the passions back to the mean and are sufficient, if we consider only the present life before God, however they are not so, nor does civil justice suffice before his judgment seat. There is need, then, for another standard, namely that of holy scripture, which is useless unless it is grasped by faith.(319)
As I say, there is some evidence for such a view: At one place (197) Vermigi asks, does not the scriptural statement that those sins have been forgiven and whose iniquities are forgiven are blessed (Ps.32.1-2) not refute the Aristotelian motif the end of man is happiness revealed in action? Vermigli replies
We are not speaking of that kind of happiness, but only of the happiness that follows primary happiness and lies in acting properly in this life and in contemplating and enjoying the sight of the supreme God in the world to come In other words. (197)
See also his reference to the virtues being political (253), having to do with the nature of civil morality. (319) So there is some ambiguity here. Sometimes Vermigli says that moral action has the same structure in Aristotle and in the gospel. (41) At other times he gently makes the point that Aristotle was a stranger to God’s revelation in Jesus. At still other times he forcefully criticises Aristotle for his paganism. Though I am not aware that Vermigli uses the terminology, he may at times be suggesting that the ethics of Aristotle has to do chiefly, if not exclusively, with the first kingdom, the earthly kingdom, and not with the kingdom of God. Certainly at one place h endorses the thought given prominence by Calvin that whatever the source of some truth God the Holy Spirit is its ultimate author. As Vermigli puts the point, ‘we do not deny the sentiment that is hallowed by the centuries, which says that any truth set forth by any author proceeds from the Holy Spirit’. (Cited by McLelland in his Introduction, but the reference to the main text (66) is inaccurate).
One other thing occurred to me: the pattern of detailed exegesis and commentary of Aristotle, followed usually by a much briefer scriptural comment, is consistent with Vermigli having first prepared and given the lectures at some stage in his earlier years in Italy – either before he adopted evangelical views, or afterwards. If afterwards, if the lectures were prepared and delivered (1537-1542) then the evangelical views, the comments on scripture, may already have been present in them; if earlier, then they may have been added during this later period as he climbed up the rungs of the ladder of the Augustinian order, finally becoming abbot of St. Pietro and Aram in Naples (1537-40) and Prior of S. Frediano in Lucca (1541-42), during which time he established a reformed theological college. There is some additional evidence for this, perhaps: those theological discussions that occur within a lecture, as opposed to being at its end, are not specifically Protestant. We have already noted a discussion of Augustine and platonic ideas, and there is one on Pelagianism, (216) which one might expect from an Augustinian friar. There are exceptions, however. In the middle of one lecture he criticises ‘what the Papists do in reducing the pure religion of Christ, which is already complete in itself, to a histrionic Mass’. (205) So the form of the lectures is generally consistent with them being in existence before Vermigli fled Italy, and then being ‘Protestantized’ by having a tail added to most of them, giving Scriptural comments of a Protestant kind. Why prepare more lectures when one already has a perfectly good set? The pre-existence of the lectures may even have determined that in Strasbourg he lectured on the Nicomachean Ethics and not on some other part of the Aristotelian corpus.
