Philosophers are interested in definitions, in the different sorts of definitions and what they do, in what words mean and what that meaning is. So it’s not surprising that a philosopher who is interested in the thought of John Calvin will also be interested in what he has to say about definitions. Not simply what he has to say, but how he thinks of definitions, what sorts of definitions interest him, and what use he makes of them in his writings.
A casual enquiry into this yielded some unexpected results. A word-search of the Battles’ translation of the Institutes provided a surprising number of definitions, surprising because even to a careful reader of that work the idea that definitions play an important structural function, and in some cases are pivotal in Calvin’s argument, is not obvious. Not obvious to me at least. This feeling of surprise is backed up by a failure to find any sustained treatment of Calvin’s attitude to and use of definitions in the literature.
In Chapter Six of his The Unaccommodated Calvin, Richard A Muller cites persuasive evidence to show that the Institutes is a ‘gathering of loci communes and disputationes’. (103) This short paper may be thought of a way in which that claim can be strengthened further. The Institutes is also a gathering of definitions; or rather the loci communes discussed there embrace definitiones , as they should. The definitions are sufficiently numerous and at sufficiently important stages of Calvin’s dogmatics in the Institutes as to identify many, though not all of the loci.
I shall provide a brief survey of Calvin’s definitions in the 1559 Institutes, concentrating on the theologically most significant of them. Then we shall consider two or three of the definitions in more detail, and try from them to understand a little of what Calvin took a definition to be, why for him they are important, and what part they play in theological argument in the Institutes.
Calvin’s interest in establishing definitions of terms has to be seen as a part of his sensitivity to the use of non-biblical terms in theology. For the practice of offering definitions is a case of the use of such terms although occasionally, as we shall see, he finds cases of biblical writers themselves offering definitions. On the one hand he defends the practice of introducing ‘foreign’ terms , in the case of the use of terms such as ‘person’ and ‘nature’ in elucidating the Trinity, and ‘alone’ in ‘justification by faith alone’. On the other hand he deplores the use of certain terms, such as ‘merit’ which while not intrinsically deplorable, have over the years of their use gathered deeply unbiblical connotations. Calvin reveals a third attitude to words which might be summed up in the principle: whenever you can, let people express biblical teaching using those terms that they are most comfortable with.
For these reasons, because Calvin is conservative by temperament, and because he is engaged in Christian theology, he does not coin new terms and define them. His typical practice is to take a term used in the Christian theological tradition – original sin, free will – and to provide his own definition of that term, or occasionally endorse another definition, and to justify this definition in terms of Scriptural teaching. Sometimes he thinks that a biblical writer offers a definition, and of course he uses or at least endorses that. So his practice is not stipulate but descriptive, descriptive definitions drawn from Scripture. He has no interest at all in stipulating his own meaning of a term.
His main aim in establishing a definition is then to use it to control the subsequent discussion. So definitions tend to be at the beginning of topics, and the definition is given without too much difficulty. Occasionally Calvin appears to struggle, but I expect that this appearance of difficulty is a rhetorical or dialectical device. The most obvious case of Calvin struggling is in fact the definition that a student of the Institutes is most likely to remember, his definition of faith. He takes some time to arrive at it, but then the various elements of the definition articulate and control the remaining discussion.
Calvin typically though not always corrects the then-current definitions in medieval scholasticism. Part of his task in establishing a definition – faith, repentance, justification – is to substitute it for its deficient predecessor. Often the contrast here is not to substitute a correct definition for one that is wrong, but to substitute one that is deep for one that Calvin thinks is shallow or superficial or leads to incoherence. This is the case, for example, in his definitions of repentance and of a sacrament, as we shall see.
What follows is largely based on the incidence of the English word ‘definition’ and sometimes ‘define’. I’ve not yet even checked whether or not Battles’ ‘definition’ always and only translates definitio, by ‘definition’. I have not looked at synonyms or near synonyms for ‘definition’, such as ‘nature of’, ‘meaning of’, except where these are alongside the use of ‘definition’. But I include one example of a definition which Calvin does not say is a definiton, but which surely is.
The Survey (page references are to Battles' translation)
Book I
7.3 (77)
11.1 (100)
13.2 A definition of God’s threeness is sought, leading to a discussion of the meaning and admissibility of the term ‘person’ and leading to a threefold definition in 13.6 Calvin rounds off the discussion by saying that he does not object to ‘Tertullian’s definition’.
Note that Calvin’s search for a definition controls the discussion across several pages
15.4 Calvin searches for a ‘full definition’ of ‘made in the image of God’ . He finds this in man’s being ensouled, which then leads him to search for a definition of the Soul and its Faculties in 15.6.
Again, a considerable amount of pivotal discussion is controlled by the search for ‘definition’.
Book II
1.4 p.245 definition of Adam’s sin – pride, but then Calvin seeks a ‘fuller definition’ – disobedience.
1.8 p.245 original sin. (Two occurrences of ‘definition’) On this occasion a quick and succinct definition is offered.
2.4 freewill , A brief survey of the definitions of Origen, Anselm, Augustine of free will, and of their attitudes to it, leading Calvin to a critique of the influence of pagan philosophy on Christian thought, and an over-eagerness to define free will in purely etymological terms. (264) This leads Calvin to approach the anthropological issue via a consideration of the effects of the fall upon the image of God and human nature and finally to offer a ‘complete definition’ of the will as ‘bound after wicked desires that it cannot strive after the right’. (II. 2.12, 271) A definition for which he then proceeds to offer a ‘fuller explanation’. I shall examine this discussion more fully in the next section.
2.22 At the end of his discussion of the way in which the knowledge of God (made known by natural law through conscience in the case of the Gentiles) and the refusal to serve him is the seat of responsibility, and not ability, Calvin remarks ‘This would not be a bad definition of natural law’ (282), a definition in terms of the ability of the conscience to make moral distinctions, rendering people inexcusable.
2.23 Themistius’ comment on the general and the particular. (282)
3.11 Augustine’s definition of operating and co-operating grace , 305
5. 6 Paul’s definition of law as having its purpose and fulfilment in love (I Tim.1.5) but who also teaches that the law has no such effect without the inner inspiration of God. (324)
8.58 RC definition of venial sin (421)
14.5 The Church’s definition of Mediator stands firm. (488)
17.6 The temerity of Lombard’s definition, that Christ acquired merit for himself. (534)
Book III
The most elaborate treatment of a definition in the Institutes concerns faith in III. 2 ‘Faith: Its Definition Set Forth, and Its Properties Explained’
Calvin’s treatment begins with the search for a definition of faith 2.1 (542) A definition of faith will enable us to ‘grasp its nature’. He is concerned here, then, not with a mere reportive definition, one which simply expresses the meaning of ‘faith’ as this word is usually used. But with ‘what faith ought to be like’ (543). Hence his polemic against the Schoolmen who wear down the whole force of faith by their ‘obscure definition’ (2.2. (544)), obscure because of their emphasis on implicit faith and on faith as mere assent.
Calvin then (2.4) begins to build towards a satisfactory definition. Faith is knowledge, but simply to know something of God’s will is not a ‘full definition’ of faith (2.7(550)). There needs to be explicit reference to the mercy of God in Christ. So, emphasising these elements, Calvin offers his own celebrated definition of faith as ‘a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts by the Holy Spirit’. (2.7 (551).
Having provided the definition Calvin sees no need to spend further time on the inadequacies of the scholastic definition, (‘their definition’ (2.8 (551)), ‘our task is simply to explain the nature of faith as it is set forth in the Word of God’. So to give a true definition of faith is to say what the nature of faith is’.
This definition becomes pivotal for the remainder of his discussion of the topic, (III.2.14-29), a discussion of each of ‘the individual parts of the definition of faith’ (559). as is seen from the fact that he then expounds each of its separate elements (‘parts’) one by one: knowledge, certainty, various obstacles and struggles, concluding with a discussion of the ‘freely given promise’ (2.29)
Calvin proceeds to rebut the claim of Pighius that faith has to do with God’s truth, and that ‘threats ought not to be excluded from the definition of it’ (576) Calvin does not demur from these points, but emphasises that faith is much more than this, for it focuses upon God’s promise, and on Christ, so that ‘when we define it there is no absurdity in our thus emphasizing its particular effect and, as a distinction, subordinating to the class that special mark which separates believers from unbelievers.’ (2.30 576)) This is a rather obscure and technical way of making the point that the definition of faith ought to include features that distinguish believers from unbelievers.
Finally, he reconciles his definition of faith, which has the promise of God as a necessary condition, with the definition of Hebrews 11.1. which in Calvin’s view is not so much a definition as a description. For the ‘substance’ of faith is the support on which faith rests, and that support is nothing other than the promise of God. The ‘evidence’ of the things not seen is the Word of God. (2.41 (588)
Calvin’s treatment of repentance (3.5) follows a similar pattern. His concern to present the ‘force and nature’ of repentance leads him to a definition: ‘it is the true turning of our life to God, a turning that arises from a pure and earnest fear of him; and it consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man, and in the vivification of the Spirit’ (3.5. (597)) This definition which Calvin ‘lays down’ has three heads, or perhaps elements: a turning (5.6), from the fear of God (5.7) consisting in mortification and vivification. (5.8)
Proceeding with a discussion of sanctification, Calvin links repentance and forgiveness. Is every sin pardonable? No there is the unpardonable sin. But what exactly is such a sin? Calvin answers by offering a definition. But first he notes Augustine’s definition as a ‘persistent stubbornness even to death’ (3.22) which he regards as inadequate and offers his own: ‘They sin against the Holy Spirit who, with evil intention, resist God’s truth, although by its brightness they are so touched that they cannot claim ignorance’. (3.22 (617))
Calvin’s treats the Roman doctrine of penance as a corruption of the idea of repentance that he has set out in III.3, His discussion of the Scholastic definition, is particularly illuminating for the understanding it reveals of his grasp of the nature of definitions, and of their importance.
As with faith, he frames his discussion in terms of a contrast between the superficiality and inadequacy of Roman definitions, substituting his own. There are a number of such definitions: ‘to repent is to weep over former sins, and not to commit sins to be wept over’. (622) It is to bewail past evil deeds and not again to commit deeds to be bewailed’. (622) The ‘Scholastic Sophists’ define repentance in terms of weeping over sin and various other expressions of sorrow for sin.
Calvin is scathing. Such expressions, he says, ‘were not spoken with the intent to define repentance’. The Scholastics turn certain statements, certain expressions of penitence and penitential actions, into definitions. (4.1 (622)) and make repentance into ‘a discipline and austerity that serves partly to tame the flesh, partly to chastise and punish faults’. (623).
Having defined penitence in these ways, they then divide it into ‘contrition of heart, confession of mouth, and satisfaction of works’ But this is illogical, ‘no more logical than the definition – even though they wish to appear to have their whole life in framing syllogisms’ (623). For one can meet one of these previously-cited definitions and yet not confess one’s sin. If a person may be truly penitent and yet not confess, how can penitence be understood in terms of a threefold division one of whose elements is confession ? Maybe when they give the three-fold division they are talking not about repentance but about perfect repentance. (624) So there is a dissonance between their definition and the way in which penance is subsequently analysed into three distinct elements ‘Now, for my part, where there is a dispute concerning anything, I am stupid enough to refer everything back to the definition itself, which is the hinge and foundation of the whole debate.’(4.1. 624) We shall also look at this example later on.
‘Definition’ appears in the title of III. 11. However Calvin does not come to refer to the definition of justification until 11.4 (729) What is interesting is that here we learn that Calvin uses other expressions almost synonymously with ‘definition’, which warns us against being exclusively lexical in our approach to Calvin’s thought in this area. In s.2 (726) he sets out to explain what the expressions that man is justified in God’s sight, and that he is justified by faith or works, mean, concluding by ‘we explain justification simply as the acceptance with which God receives us into his favor as righteous men’. Here ‘explain’ is simply to provide an explanation not of justification, but of the meaning of ‘justification’. To do this is equivalent, for Calvin, of giving the meaning of ‘justify’. And, so that we shall not fix exclusively on the term ‘justification’ he uses ‘acceptance’ interchangeably and finally notes Paul’s approval of David’s definition ‘when he declares those men blessed to whom free pardon of sins is given [Ps.32:1-2]. (729)
Later on in the discussion (11.21) he refers back to his own earlier definition (815) and in III.17, in his discussion of James and Paul, argues that the resolution of the apparent contradiction between them rests in remembering James’s definition of dead faith. (815)
At III.19.15 he offers a definition of conscience , which we must obtain ‘from the derivation of the word. As a ‘certain mean between God and man’ which ‘does not allow man to suppress within himself what he knows, but pursues him to the point of convicting him’. (848) This is repeated in IV. 10.3 (1181)
In his exposition of the second petition of the Lord’s Prayer (III.20.42) he refers to his definition of ‘this Kingdom’ as the place where ‘God reigns where men, both by denial of themselves and by contempt of the world and of earthly life, pledge themselves to his righteousness in order to aspire to a heavenly life’. (905)
Finally in Book III a glance at a definition which Calvin does not say is one : ‘Predestination is 'God’s eternal decree, by which he determined with himself what he willed to become of each man.’ (Inst. III.21.5)
Book IV
Calvin offers a definition of the church (2.3 ) and of a true presbyter (5.10) and of the power of the keys : ’men are bound and loosed in no other way than when faith reconciles some to God, while their own unbelief constrains others the more’. (6.4 (1105)) IV. 9.8 (1171) and IV.9.13 (1176) are references to the definitions made by church councils.
IV. 10 16 (1194) Calvin offers a definition of tradition as all laws apart from God’s Word, laws made by men, either to prescribe the manner of worshiping God or to bind consciences by scruples, as if they were making rules out things necessary for salvation.
Calvin offers a definition of a sacrament (IV.14.1 (1277) referred to again IV. 14.3. His further discussion (IV. 19. 1 ((1449) offers an interesting insight into his attitude to definitions. The question under discussion is the attachment of the term ‘sacrament’ to the five other rites besides baptism and the Supper. He refuses to call these sacraments not out of a scruple about a word but for ‘weighty reasons’.
I am quite aware that Christians are lords both of words and of all things, and can therefore apply words to things as they choose, provided a pious sense be kept, even though there may be some incorrect usage in speaking. I grant all this, although it would be better for words to be subject to things rather than things to words. But in the word ‘sacrament’ the case is different. For those who postulate seven sacraments apply to all together the definition that the are visible forms of an invisible grace. (1449)
In other words, in attributing the word ‘sacrament’ to seven things, they ascribe sacramental value to five of them wrongly, in Calvin’s view. (At IV.19.15 there is a passing reference to his earlier definition of a sacrament.) 19.27 is a reference to the Roman definition of a sacrament. (1475). I shall also look at this in more detail shortly.
17.29 In the context of discussion of the Supper, Calvin argues that if transubstantiation is allowed then a ‘new definition of body’ will have to be coined because of the alleged invisibility of the body of Christ in the Mass. (1399)
A Closer Look
Free will
2.4 freewill. In general, Calvin has a more favourable attitude to pagan philosophers when they discuss metaphysical matters than moral philosophy. The issue of free will is one where moral and metaphysical issues come together. As regards the metaphysics, Calvin is something of a stoic, despite his contempt for ‘stoic fatalism’. Melanchthon’s nickname for his friend Calvin was ‘Zeno’, though perhaps he did not call him this to his face. (See Melanchthon’s letter of 1st February 1552 to Joachim Camer) But Calvin regarded the issue of free will in the church as mainly a moral issue, and here he thinks that the early church, with the exception of Augustine, was over-influenced by pagan ideas. Partly it was that these philosophers had no conception of the fall, and so mistook a ruin for a building, as he says on one occasion. Partly, and consequently, that they had exaggerated views of human moral powers, powers to choose the good. This results in an ‘etymological’ definition of free will.
By this Calvin means that the church was content with a definition of free will as the choice between alternatives, with no restriction placed on the nature or the range of choice, or the motivation of that choice, by taking into account man’s fallenness. His ‘complete definition’ of the will as ‘bound after wicked desires that it cannot strive after the right’. (II. 2.12, 271) A definition for which he then proceeds to offer a ‘fuller explanation’. This is of course a far from complete definition; it is only a definition of the fallen human will, crucial in Reformation debates over the bondage and liberation of the will, but partial for all that.
(Compare Calvin’s advice in the Bondage and Liberation of the Will regarding the meaning of ‘free will’: ‘And yet if there is agreement among the learned about its meaning, I will allow them to make use of that word. And I will not even impede its use before the general public, if that which is designated by it is clearly explained. Where this cannot be achieve, I now warn readers to pay attention to the thing itself rather than to its name’. (69))
Faith
The most elaborate treatment of a definition in the Institutes concerns faith in III. 2 ‘ Of Faith. The Definition of it. Its Peculiar Properties., and Its Properties Explained’.
Calvin’s treatment begins with the search for a definition of faith 2.1 (542) A definition of faith will enable us to ‘grasp its nature’. He is concerned here, then, not with a mere reportive definition, one which simply expresses the meaning of ‘faith’ as this word is usually used. But with ‘what faith ought to be like’ (543). So here, in this crucial area, Calvin is more concerned with ‘ideal faith’, faith in its fullest form, rather than faith as it routinely occurs. The obscurity of the school definition of faith is due to the schoolmen’s emphasis upon implicit faith and faith as mere assent. Faith as trust in the explicitly-given promises of God, summed up in Christ, is absent. So step by step Calvin builds to a satisfactory definition (2.4) by delineating a series of necessary conditions – knowledge, the mercy of God in Christ finally giving his celebrated definition in which trust, is surprisingly absent, or at least only implicit. (2.7 (550)). Faith is ‘a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts by the Holy Spirit’. (2.7 (551).
But it needs to be remembered that the definition is faith in its ideal form, as is seen by what, in Calvin’s discussion, comes immediately before, and then immediately after, the definition itself. Having given the definition Calvin sees no need to spend further time on the inadequacies of the scholastic definition, (‘their definition’ (2.8 (551)), ‘our task is simply to explain the nature of faith as it is set forth in the Word of God’. So to give a true definition of faith is to say what the nature of faith is.
This definition becomes pivotal for the remainder of his discussion of the topic, (III.2.14-29), a discussion of each of ‘the individual parts of the definition of faith’ (559) as is seen from the fact that he then expounds each of its separate elements (‘parts’) one by one: knowledge, certainty, various obstacles and struggles, concluding with a discussion of the ‘freely given promise’ (2.29)
Calvin goes on to rebut the claim of Pighius that faith has to do with God’s truth, and that ‘threats ought not to be excluded from the definition of it’ (576) Calvin does not demur but emphasises that it focuses upon God’s promise, and on Christ, so that ‘when we define it there is no absurdity in our thus emphasizing its particular effect and, as a distinction, subordinating to the class that special mark which separates believers from unbelievers.’ (2.30 576)) This is a rather obscure and technical way of making the point that the definition of faith ought to include features that distinguish believers from unbelievers.
Finally, he reconciles his definition of faith, which has the promise of God as a necessary condition, with the definition of Hebrews 11.1. which in Calvin’s view is not so much a definition as a description. For the ‘substance’ of faith is the support on which faith rests, and that support is nothing other than the promise of God. The ‘evidence’ of the things not seen is the Word of God. (2.41 (588)
Calvin seems to have attached a particular importance to the definition of faith as it is the only definition that appears (somewhat shortened) in the Catechism of the Church of Geneva - (‘It may be defined – a sure and steadfast knowledge of the paternal good will of God toward us, as he declares in the gospel that for the sake of Christ he will be our Father and Saviour.’ (Tracts 2.33))
Repentance
Calvin’s treatment of repentance (3.5) follows a similar pattern. His concern to present the ‘force and nature’ of repentance leads him to a definition: ‘it is the true turning of our life to God, a turning that arises from a pure and earnest fear of him; and it consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man, and in the vivification of the Spirit’ (3.5. (597)) This definition which Calvin ‘lays down’ has three heads, or perhaps elements: a turning (5.6), from the fear of God (5.7) consisting in mortification and vivification. (5.8)
Proceeding with a discussion of sanctification, Calvin links repentance and forgiveness. Is every sin pardonable? No there is the unpardonable sin. But what exactly is such a sin? Calvin answers by offering a definition. But first he notes Augustine’s definition as a ‘persistent stubbornness even to death’ (3.22) which he regards as inadequate and offers his own: ‘They sin against the Holy Spirit who, with evil intention, resist God’s truth, although by its brightness they are so touched that they cannot claim ignorance’. (3.22 (617))
Calvin’s treats the Roman doctrine of penance as a corruption of the idea of repentance that he has set out in III.3, His discussion of the Scholastic definition, is particularly illuminating for the understanding it reveals of his grasp of the nature of definitions, and of their importance.
As with faith, he frames his discussion in terms of a contrast between the superficiality and inadequacy of Roman definitions, substituting his own. There are a number of such definitions: ‘to repent is to weep over former sins, and not to commit sins to be wept over’. (622) It is to bewail past evil deeds and not again to commit deeds to be bewailed’. (622) The ‘Scholastic Sophists’ define repentance in terms of weeping over sin and various other expressions of sorrow for sin.
Calvin is scathing. Such expressions, he says, ‘were not spoken with the intent to define repentance’. The Scholastics turn certain statements, certain expressions of penitence and penitential actions, into definitions. (4.1 (622)) and make repentance into ‘a discipline and austerity that serves partly to tame the flesh, partly to chastise and punish faults’. (623).
Having defined penitence in these ways, they then divide it into ‘contrition of heart, confession of mouth, and satisfaction of works’ But this is illogical, ‘no more logical than the definition – even though they wish to appear to have their whole life in framing syllogisms’ (623) For one can meet one of these previously-cited definitions and et not confess. If a person may be truly penitent and not confession, how can penitence be understood in terms of a threefold divisions one of whose elements is confession ? Maybe when they give the three-fold division they are talking not about repentance but about perfect repentance. (624) So there is a dissonance between their definition and the way in which penance is subsequently analysed into three distinct elements ‘Now, for my part, where there is a dispute concerning anything, I am stupid enough to refer everything back to the definition itself, which is the hinge and foundation of the whole debate.’(4.1. 624)
Sacrament
Calvin offers a definition of a sacrament (IV.14.1 (1277) referred to again IV. 14.3. His further discussion (IV. 19. 1 ((1449) offers an interesting insight into his attitude to definitions. The question under discussion is the attachment of the term ‘sacrament’ to the five other rites besides baptism and the Supper. He refuses to call these sacraments not out of a scruple about a word but for ‘weighty reasons’.
Pivotal themes
More than once in discussing and delivering his definitions Calvin hints at his metaphysical outlook. Definitions are not merely verbal, defining one term or terms by another. They are not terms of convenience, arbitrarily given. It would be hard to develop a case for nominalism from Calvin’s procedure. Although he talks approvingly once of being ‘lords’ of words, this is a remark about Christians, not about the relation between words and reality. The terms we have seen him define are not merely Christian usage, but they are intended to represent divine realities. They are intended as ‘real definitions’, the specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being, say, original sin.
Original sin is a reality: its character is revealed in Scripture. It is the theologians’ task to represent that revealed reality and one of their tools in this task is definition. The fact that we can define these realities does not mean that we master them, or even that we fully understand them, but it is testimony to the fact that definable realities have a nature. That is, according to Calvin (and of course according to the scholastic tradition) definitions are made possible by natures or essences. There is a nature or essence to original sin; so it is possible to define it. Defining it ‘explains’ it not in the sense that mysteries can be de-mystified, but in the more pedestrian sense that we can provide verbal equivalents (which we understand better, or think that we do) for terms for these mysteries. We understand the definiens better than we understand better than the definiendum. Though, as is clear from his definition of God’s triunity Calvin is concerned that we should not be captivated by mere verbal formulae, for he is easy about the varied terminology used by the Fathers regarding the threeness, provided that the terminology is in each used to provide a ’real’ definition, one coinciding with divine triunity.
There is one final characteristic of definitions that is surprising but which ought not to be. The prominence given to definitions in the Institutes is not merely testimony to the Calvinian love of order. Calvin shows that he thinks we ought to be moved by these definitions, not moved to admiration for the cleverness of the definer, but moved by the divine reality defined. For he notes more than once that an apt definition reveals the ‘force’ of an idea. These realities, once defined, are not meant to be filed away, or argued over – they are not to ‘flit in the brain’ but to move us.
There is one more thing. A survey of these discussions is in fact a run-down of the main themes of the Reformation – original sin, free will, faith, repentance, justification. For Calvin the Reformation was about the recovering of biblical realities, or their rediscovery, and one main way in which this recovering takes place is in the defining of those realities. It is additionally interesting that the emphasis falls upon anthropological themes rather than the doctrine of God, theology in a narrower sense. In fact apart from the definition given in the course of his discussion of the Trinity, Calvin does not, as far as I can discover, ever approach the reality of God by first searching for a definition of God. (And even his Trinitarian discussion is about the meaning of ‘person’, though here again there might be a definition without using the word, as when he states ‘Father and Son and Spirit are one God, yet the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but that they are differentiated by a peculiar quality’ (Inst. I.13.5) No doubt this disinclination to define ‘God’ is fully consistent with Calvin’s restrained approach to the being of God, testimony to the importance for him of the contrast he draws throughout the Institutes and elsewhere between God ‘as he is in himself’ and God ‘as he is towards us’. He repeatedly disdains the search for what God is as against what he is to us.
