Tuesday, September 01, 2015

Particular Baptists and the covenant



This is the fourth post in a series on Particular Baptist theology and its confessional roots. In it I shall sketch what are some good grounds for thinking that such theology takes a distinctive position on the covenant, or covenants, as we shall see. There is a considerable recent literature on this theme, from which I have learned a good deal. Because of this, my account will be sketchy. What I wish eventually to draw from this discussion of the covenants are some ecclesiastical consequences, which are touched on occasionally in the modern discussion. But more could be made of them, I believe. Such a view of the covenants seems to me to be critical for an overall account of the coherence of a Particular Baptist position.

First, a brief discussion of the differences between the Westminster Confession (1647) on the covenant, and the Baptist Confession of 1689. Then a discussion of the distinctive position adopted by some Baptists and some others.  The hermeneutical implications for the Baptist view of the church  will come in a following post.

The Confessional position

This is part of the wording of the covenant of grace in the Baptist Confession of 1689

It pleased the Lord to make a covenant of grace, wherein he freely offereth to sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ….This covenant is revealed in the gospel: first of all to Adam…and afterwards by further steps, until the full discovery thereof was completed in the New Testament.

This wording presents quite a different form of the revealing of the gospel from that of the Westminster Confession. The emphasis is on the gradual unfolding rather than a sharp revelation of the covenant that the Westminster Confession provides. (One covenant of grace, two administrations.) In the Baptist account there is a gradualist understanding of this ‘discovery’ (i.e. disclosing) of the covenant. The differences must not be exaggerated, but they are quite distinct, and the Baptist wording gives the covenant of grace a flavor of its own. (The Savoy Declaration (1658) is different in wording but very similar in meaning to the 1689 Baptist Confession, speaking of the covenant ‘being differently and variously administered in respect of ordinancies and institutions in the time of the law,  and since the coming of Christ in the flesh’. Yet it is ‘one and the same’…’covenant of grace (7.5))

The gradualist approach that we notice is to be understood as permitting a disentangling of the gospel from the law, in the case of Moses, and those matters which according to the Epistle to the Hebrews by now have ‘faded away’. (In the case of Abraham, the wording makes possible a similar disentangling of the progeny of Abraham as regards the scope of the covenant of grace. We’ll look at Abraham next time). With these disentanglings there comes an appreciation of the fact that under the Mosaic covenant different things were going on under the same administration. Some of these things were babyish representations of that covenant, destined to pass away. Others were social institutions that were intended to guard the integrity of the covenant people from the surrounding culture. (Gal.4. 2-3) Throughout there were also typical elements foreshadowing the coming of the covenant of grace in its fullness. I think that this may best be understood if we first consider the Mosaic covenant, and then the Abrahamic covenant. This appreciation of the gradual implementation of the covenant also provides for Jeremiah 31. 31, widely quoted and alluded to the New Testament,  being given its full weight. as we shall note later.

Moses

Paul’s teaching about the purpose of the law in Galatians is significant and critical. It is an important fact for him that the law came after the covenant was established, when it was first promised to Adam and given explicit covenantal form to Abraham. In that covenant with Abraham there is both an eternal and a temporal element. The law when it came to Moses was in fact a fulfillment of the covenant to Abraham in its temporal sense. The Mosaic law, as long as it endured, was as a fence, a guardian, ‘until Christ came, in order that we might be justified by faith’. ‘But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a guardian, for in Christ Jesus you are all sons if God through faith. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put in Christ’.  Although we often concentrate on the failure of Israel, Paul does not focus on failure. (Gal. 3.24-7)  The law despite the faithlessness of the people nevertheless served to keep a nation together until, despite exile and colonisation, until the coming of Christ. This temporary arrangement served the purposes of the outworking and flourishing of the covenant of grace, but was not itself an expression of that covenant, except in certain typological respects à la Letter to the Hebrews. It embraced both the moral, the judicial and the ceremonial law, looking forward to what which was to come in ‘the fullness of time’, when God sent his Son. The blessings of the covenant to those who are largely but not universally embedded within the line of Isaac.

But why did that covenant have this role as a guardian? It was the preservative condition for a time, preserving those Jews benefitting from its terms from cultural exposure to the surrounding nations and cults, for example. Its law and its penalties helped to erect and keep in place a preserving barrier for the coming of the messianic age. It did not itself confer the benefits of the covenant of grace.

But there were beneficiaries of the covenant of grace during that period as we can see from the heroes of faith of Hebrews 11, and from the deep faith of a remnant of the nation who welcomed the Messiah who came at the appointed time, in the fulness of time. In the detail of the OT there is evidence of a remnant within the nation who had received ‘circumcision of the heart’ (Deut.10.16; Rom. 2.28-9). Such poor and needy Jews, who feared the Lord, whose piety is expressed in the Psalms, who in the time of Elijah did not ‘bow the knee to Baal’, and so on.


Israel and ‘not Israel’

Then at the time of the coming of the Messiah there were individuals such as Anna and Simeon and the extended family of Jesus – his mother Mary (and no doubt Joseph), Elizabeth and Zechariah, whose lives we get a glimpse of, particularly in Luke’s gospel – in the words of the Magnificat and of Zechariah’s prophecy in Luke 1, in which the events of the new covenant are described using the conceptuality of the Old. Mary speaks of God remembering his mercy ‘as he spoke to our fathers, to Abraham and to his offspring for ever’ (Lk. 1.55); and Simeon who ‘was waiting for the consolation of Israel’  (2.25) and Anna the prophetess who spoke of God ‘to all who were waiting for the redemption of Jerusalem’. (2.38)

At the same time there is evidence of the weaving of Gentiles into the history of Israel, and even of them being in the human line of the Messiah, typified by Ruth the Moabitess. So it was true of the history of Israel throughout, as it was true in Paul’s time: ‘So too at the present time there is a remnant, chosen by grace’ (Rom.11.5). And as Peter declared at the Council of Jerusalem, as the Gentiles were grafted in, in that sense that ‘the tent of David was being rebuilt…..that the remnant of mankind may seek the Lord, and all the Gentiles  who are called by my name.’ (Acts 15.16) There are two principles at work here: ‘Not all who are descended from Israel belong to  Israel’ (Rom.9.6) and ‘Those who were not my people I will call “my people”’. (v. 25) Who are these? Those ‘whom he has called, not only from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles’. (Rom. 9.24) Paul then cites Hosea’s prophecy, part of which has just been quoted, and words from Isaiah.

In the next post we shall look a little at the Abrahamic covenant, and then try to make sense of all this in terms of the outworking of the covenant of grace in  pre-Incarnation and post-Incarnation history.






Saturday, August 01, 2015

Christian Theism and the Particular Baptists


Above  is Edward Reynolds, (1599-1676) a member of the Westminster Assembly who conformed to the Church of England in 1662, and later became Bishop of Norwich. John Flavel referred to him as 'a living library, a third university'. Beneath is Benjamin Keach, (1640-1704) , a signatory to the Baptist Confession of 1689.  He seems to be rather surprised to be so near a bishop.

In what I intended (and still intend) as a brief account of Baptist Reformed Confessional theology began with the striking fact that the Particular Baptists of the seventeenth century were content to use the confessional language of their persecutors and would-be persecutors, including the phrase of God, that he is ‘without body, parts and passions’. This phrase was ascribed to Almighty God in all major English confessional documents of the Reformation and subsequently into the seventeenth century, including the Baptist Confession of 1689. We then thought of divine passionlessness, and saw that it was connected with divine immutability as it is found, for example, in Hebrews 6.  And we also considered divine partlessness, or simplicity, God's metaphysical oneness. We now consider further the connectedness of these with other features - not parts, of course - of God.

I

To think consistently and clearly about God our Creator, who is or has become our Redeemer in Christ, is unfamiliar to many and it is not easy. Such thinking calls for discipline, and also patience. Consistency should be our aim, since the Lord our God is one Lord. He cannot be at odds with himself. While recognising God’s ultimate incomprehensibility, we should not take short-term relief by appealing to paradox, tension, antinomy and the like. Sometimes people object to the discipline of theology as if it was an attempt to ‘master’ God, to pin him down, or to put him in a box. But to try and think in a straight and consistent way about God is not to make God a plaything. Sad to say, to characterise as clearly as we can what a Pit Bull Terrier is, is not to tame such an unappealing animal. Defined or not, the reality of the dog, and the terror it may arouse, are just as real. Modernity has become used to thinking of God as our buddy, as a familiar friend, or as our benign grandfather. So as we make plans, we may automatically think that God must have the plans that we have. That our plans become his plans. If not, whatever is going on? But that would be a serious misapprehension. God may have plans besides the plans we have, or things may be such that both God and ourselves cannot achieve the same goals. The biblical way is for us to commit ourselves to God's plans insofar as he has revealed them. 'Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth'. It is both lazy and presumptuous to bring down God to our size. He is altogether beyond our imagination, too wonderful and strange to be fully captured in our words. This is so even though it is in our words that he reveals himself as our covenant God, our redeemer.

The basic posture that we are to adopt is to think of God, who transcends our own fleeting existence in space and time, as coming down in grace to us. He comes down to us in his revelation, adapting himself to our language, using figures and similes in order to address us. And he comes down in the Incarnation, which is not God becoming man, as milk becomes cheese, or wood becomes ash, or a boy becomes a man. This God, immaculate and immutable in his perfection, takes on human nature, and so humbles himself to be our mediator and friend.

II

To begin to grasp this we must learn a new language that befits talking about the Creator who transcends us in ways that Scripture has in characterizing God. The church has coined words like ‘Trinity’ and ‘impute’ to refer to divine realities, that God is three and one, and that in Christ, he has counted our sins to himself, and his righteousness to us. In a similar way there is a language about God that the church, from the Patristic period onwards, has adopted to speak – daringly it must be said - of God as he is in himself.  It is best to think of such language not as the language of a science, theology, but rather as providing us with a grammar. It is not that theologians can see further than anyone else, or are cleverer than other people, or that they can provide explanations for us, like consultant engineers do, for example. Rather, theologians attend to grammar, theological grammar, to try to epitomize God and his ways, to help not to go off the rails by onesidedly stressing data in Scripture at the expense of other data. This is stammering about God, for by it we cannot comprehend God as he is in himself. For how can the finite encompass the infinite? Rather we talk of him in such a way as to avoid fundamental biblical errors in our talk, in the present case we endeavour not to confound the Creator with any of his creatures.

So to speak of God’s simplicity, his being without parts, is to speak not of a simplicity that is to be pitied, but of the oneness or unity that befits the Creator of the ends of the earth. The Lord our God is one Lord.  To imagine that the Creator is composed out of parts,  made out of stuff that is more basic than he is, is to be suppose that his parts were not created, implying that God is not the creator of everything. In physical nature there seems to be a divisibility all the way down. But in God, the creator of nature, there is unity, indivisibility. So one way of thinking about this is to affirm that God does not consist of parts that are more basic than he is.   To think that would reduce him to the level of a creature. So Christian trinitarianism does not assert that God has one part who is the Father, another part the Son and another the Holy Spirit. If we are going to be faithful to the biblical witness we must distinguish three persons in the Trinity, but these three persons are not three parts. Mysterious? Certainly. Incoherent? Certainly not. For this is the fundamental feature of the Christian religion.

So we begin to learn to talk of God, the God of the Bible, when we construe his unity in this sense. Last time we applied this simplicity to eternity and to time. God is not subject to ‘ever rolling stream’, he is not bound by time. For one thing, time is a sign of change. We change by gaining and losing parts, by coming to have thoughts and beliefs, and modifying them, and we have brain cells and body muscles, we age. We are in time. But God has created the universe, with ourselves a part it, from a standpoint outside time. He does not change, he alone has immortality (I Tim. 6.16). So to talk of the age of God, or his memories and anticipations, would be to talk of him in creaturely, not in creatorly terms.

Being atemporal, God is immutable. This does not mean that God has decided to be immutable, but that he is. To suppose his immutability rested upon his decision is confused. For if this we so, on what would we base our confidence in his promises? So God is essentially or necessarily immutable. As the writer of the Letter to the Hebrews shows, such immutability is one of God’s great-making properties. (Heb. 6. 13-18). He is immutable by nature.

And closely connected with God’s simplicity and his atemporality is his aseity. ‘Aseity’, independence, is an unfamiliar word, yet the idea behind it is a vital one. It is the root idea behind the affirmation of the underivedness of God,, that God is a se, from himself. This does not mean that God has created himself, he is uncreated. This idea of aseity has a strong element of negativity to it, as all the expressions we are considering have. So aseity does not mean that God has made himself, that would be incoherent, but that the child’s question ‘God made me, but who made God?’ rests upon a misunderstanding. In learning the grammar of his faith, the child has slipped up, misspoken. But the mistake is easily corrected. How could anything or anyone have made God, for he is the Creator of everything except himself? He is uncreated. It makes no sense to say that God was made, for to do so once again confounds the Creator-creature distinction. It is a mistake in the grammar of our language of God. The Creator-creature distinction is fundamental to all Christian theology; we must never lose sight of it.

The interconnectedness of the simplicity, the timelessness, the immutability and the aseity of God, (and of God’s full activity) lies at the heart of Christian theism. It is important to stress that this connectedness is not only a work of human reason, but that it is first and foremost grounded in God himself, and made known in Holy Scripture. We noted this about immutability, and it is so with eternality and aseity and the rest. We may make distinctions in our thought of God, as when we say that God is three persons. But such distinctions are not divisions in the reality of God. 

III

The modern separation of the elements of theological education, the development of separate specialisms, whether in the College or Seminary, or in the pew or the Bible-study group, is a mixed blessing. To be sure, we have the benefit of the various disciplines, Old Testament, New Testament, the Ancient Near East, historical theology, biblical theology, and so on. But who or what is to put Humpty-Dumpty together again?   We must learn to cultivate an appreciation of the synoptic standpoint of our Creator, to whose one universe of creation and redemption every page of Scripture testifies.  Not only is he our Creator, but the very same God is our Redeemer, and wherever the Lord is spoken of in Scripture it is this Lord. His word is the one word of the one God. His indivisible reality provides the basic hermeneutical key to every passage of Scripture.


So the Particular Baptists, so long as they remain true to their historic confessional position, are theists in this, the grandest sense, classical theists. 

Next time in this short series we shall look at the first of two ways (I am not saying that there are only two such ways), in which the early Calvinistic Baptists took a different line from the Westminster Confession and, it seems, from the bulk of Reformed theologians.

Wednesday, July 01, 2015

Flags


While the Confederate flag is being lowered in parts of the US the rainbow flag is being raised on UK Government buildings and I suppose on US Government buildings too. If not, then I suppose it is only a matter of time. The policies are different but the thinking behind this difference is the same. The Confederate flag is being lowered because flying it encourages racism, it is said. The rainbow flag is being raised because doing so allegedly encourages ‘inclusivism’, a culture in which many expressions of gender are not only tolerated but actively supported, and at the highest political levels support is given for gays, the governments showing pride in gay pride by raising their flag. But every 'included' supports an 'excluded',  remember.
           
In our society there is a shocking ignorance of the relation between morality and law in places where one would expect better. And the talk of 'inclusivism' is an example of it. Melvyn Tinker recently publicly protested at the draping of a rainbow flag on the steps of York Minster, and at the plan to offer prayers at the Minster in support of gay pride in all its various hues by a Minister clergyman. This create a stir, and when Melvyn was interviewed on TV the courteous BBC TV presenter ended the interview by referring to Melvyn's possible punishment, despite Melvyn's assertion that he was upholding the present position of the Church of England, and of Scripture, and the legitimacy of civilised discussion of such matters, and of protesting.

The interviewer's remark, and the earlier line of questioning, and the piece in thDaily Telegraph, shows the failure to grasp two elementary points. The first is that even raising the legitimacy of Tinker's action is a muffling of the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between the law as it stands at any one time in a society, and morality, of what is regarded as expressions of what is morally right and wrong, morally better and morally worse, about which the members of that society will, in our current pluralistic culture, have varied and conflicting ideas. Without the recognition that a law may possibly be morally wrong, or that one law may be a moral improvement on an earlier law, there can be no prospect of improvement, and likewise no moral degeneracy, in what a law permits. Or it may be more accurate to say that  the distinction between law and morality is recognised so long as what are regarded as discriminatory laws are being dismantled, but forgotten thereafter. So long as it is forgotten, the situation is characteristic of fascist and communist societies, of having to regard what the law at any one time embodies what is morally right and wrong at that time. In such a situation it takes only a little propaganda to create the illusion that a government’s legislative programme is inevitably making a society more and more inclusive and equal, morally better and better.

In a ‘free’ society, it is possible for a citizen who is a critic of the government to openly, that is publicly, to offer, in print or in speech, a critique of some law passed by the government of the day. This is called ‘freedom of speech’,  and has been the historic position in England since at least the late seventeenth century. But we have reached the position today in which the BBC and other media shut down the prospect of such debate by assuming that the government’s current position on some matter of marital or sexual ethics is the correct one, sidelining or ridiculing views that express a dissenting opinion. This is a curtailing of free speech, and a violation of the BBC’s raison d’etre to report the news objectively.

This odd and unacceptable state of affairs is currently compounded by the widely-held opinion that opposition to some ethical position the state/government enacts  is an the expression of hatred towards some group or other. So the law about morals is buttressed by further expression about the moral position of an objector to that law, that not only is the objector at fault because he is an objector, but that his objecting must be an expression of hatred of his fellows. And who decides whether or not the objector to the law is also a hater – why, the one who gains by the law! If he is offended by his fellow citizens’ free speech, that that expression of opinion may be judged ipso facto to constitute a hate crime. And the evidence that is relevant to establishing this is the say-so of the ‘offended’ party.  If someone expresses the opinion that he is offended by, then the person who has expressed the contrary view is his 'hater'. A triple lock on the suppression of freedom of speech.

Which brings us to the second elementary point. This is that two or more matters can be similar in some respect without being the same. An orange is in the same category as an apple in being a fruit, but that does not mean that an orange is an apple. So Melvyn Tinker’s protest is faced with this headline from the Daily Telegraph running roughshod over that simple distinction: 

A vicar is facing a storm of protest after likening homosexuality to paedophilia and serial adultery as he attacked plans to drape a giant rainbow flag from the steps of York Minster in solidarity with lesbian, gay, and transgender rights.

Well, yes and no. Melvyn Tinker was asserting that it is the Church of England's position, and that of the Bible,  that practicing homosexuality, like paedophilia and serial adultery, is a seriously immoral activity. Nothing less and nothing more. The further question of how these three immoralities should be ranked in respect of their immorality, was not and is not being discussed. But of course it is a moral question well worth discussing.



**For the link to Melvyn Tinker’s interview on Look North, courtesy of St. John’s Newland, Hull,  see  https://vimeo.com/131553816  code SJN2015